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MEDICINE AND LITERATURE: THE CASE OF FELISBERTO
HERNÁNDEZ

Jaime R. Brenes Reyes
The University of Western Ontario, Canada

“To be a good clinician you have to shut up and let the patient
be the most important person in the room”
– Mark Vonnegut.1

In this essay, I endeavour to enter the world of the fantastic with
the help of medical inquiry methods at hand and mind. However, as
it will be shown, the ‘I’ becomes one more character in the defining
moment of attempting to grasp the fantastic from either the literary or
medical perspective. My main intent is to question the medicalization of
literature and turn the tide against such a movement, while also using
it to provide hopefully valuable insight for the study of the fantastic. As
Mark Vonnegut says, the patient, or the corpus,2 is the most important
person in the room. Likewise, I argue that the literary text is the most
important entity in the reading room, for it speaks for itself.
In order to engage with the question whether a medical perspective
can add to the understanding of fantastic literature, I am discussing a
lesser-known author, the Uruguayan Felisberto Hernández, who was
influential for important authors, such as García Márquez, Calvino, and
Cortázar. I will further use one of Felisberto’s stories as well as his own
“explicación falsa” in order to introduce a discussion surrounding the
benefits and dangers of a medical reading of literature. From Felisberto,
whose stories and novellas focus mainly on the subjectification of objects
and the impact of these objects upon subjects, I take a hypothetical
diagnosis of the fantastic as a critique of narrative medicine. Felisberto,
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for whom the senses are of utmost importance, appears to deconstruct
– before Paul de Man but not unlike him – the oversimplification of
literature readings and also to question the dialogism that may or may
not be present in the fantastic literary genre.
At most, this essay intends to criticize attempts to make quick and
easy work of literary criticism. Notwithstanding the rewarding sensation
experts from other areas may experience when turning towards fantastic
literature, I believe, as both patient and reader, that there is something
more to be said about peoples’ stories and tales. Fantastic literature
reminds those in medicine and the sciences that there are textual aspects
that cannot be easily grasped and that require a different point of access
than medical discourse. By enabling the text to speak for itself, literary
theory and medicine have the potential to mediate the bringing forth of
a medication – a potential cure to medicalization itself.
Narratives: Medicare in Literature
Since its introduction by the physician and literary critic Rita Charon,
in her 2006 Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness, an emerging
school of thought has attracted scholars from literature and medicine to
the “health humanities.” Following this restarting point, one could witness
not only a medical turn in the humanities, but also a ‘humanistic’ turn
in medicine. For instance, a growing number of medical schools across
North America now require courses on literature in order for physicians
to graduate and be considered fully trained (cf. Health Humanities Reader).
Additionally, other disciplines such as “disability studies” and “Mad
studies” offer harsh criticism of the normalization and institutionalization
of medicine and, therefore, of the patient. My interest lies not only in
running a literature review of the medical turn to literary texts, but
also in revisiting the medical experts’ reading – and exercising some
influence upon the interpretation – of literature. The themes of the author
and authority are of special relevance here, as the medical approach
normalizes, via diagnoses, what a certain person could have written
and offers an explanation for those acts. Thus, a medical interpretation
of literature can transform the acts of reading and writing into clinical
practices, with potentially damaging implications for literary analysis.
Charon advocates what she terms “narrative medicine.” In her view,
this is a “medicine practiced with the narrative competence to recognize,
absorb, interpret, and be moved by stories of illness” (VII). She appears
to be a physician ready to being moved by her patient’s anecdotal
experiences. It strikes me that such a move would be considered a new
wave in the medical practice. As has been shown through the works
of theorists, including from Deleuze and Foucault, medicine since the
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Enlightenment has had as its purpose to discipline the body by defining
each of its organs and behaviours. Modern medical discourse framed
its patients as subdued, passive entities to be diagnosed, medicated or
operated on without other recourse. So, it is refreshing to learn of recent
practitioners who welcome the opportunity to listen to their patients.
Charon does admit that medicine has to renew itself in order to lose “its
impersonality, its fragmentation, its coldness, its self-interestedness, its
lack of social conscience” (10). Charon understands the position that
medicine has taken, yet believes that physicians can change the course
of their discipline.
Admittedly, narrative medicine attempts to create a reading
environment that comprises both patient and doctor. The patient is
recognized as a narrator whose stories call for the doctor’s attention and
understanding in order to arrive at a correct diagnosis. The patient, in
a way, becomes a text to be read. There are traces of a hermeneutics at
work in Charon’s project, a specific reading to be made no matter how
the reader (in this case, the doctor) may or may not be moved by the
text. In Charon’s words: “Narrative competence permits caregivers to
fathom what their patients go through, to attain that illuminated grasp
of another’s experience that provides them with diagnostic accuracy
and therapeutic direction” (11). My initial reaction was that narrative
medicine intends to comprehend the patient’s perspective in order to
illuminate both the physician and the patient in the room. But then, I
turned my attention to their reading and understanding of the corpus.
Both literary critic and physician are called upon to impose a diagnosis
on their respective corpora, so Charon’s approach may not be far from
the practice of those involved in literary studies. “Like lawyers, teachers,
historians, and journalists,” she writes, “health care professionals have
come to realize that they must understand these building blocks of stories
in order to do their work” (41). The question, however, remains for both
the critic and the doctor: “What does it mean to understand a story?” I
take it that narrative medicine’s reading considers the patient to be the
“literary corpus,” a text to be explained via practice. Such an analogy
recalls Michel de Certeau’s analysis of history and modern medicine.
According to de Certeau:
Thanks to the unfolding of the body before the doctor’s eye, what is seen
and what is known of it can be superimposed or exchanged (be translated
from one to the other). The body is a cipher that awaits deciphering.
Between the seventeenth and the eighteenth century, what allows the
seen body to be converted into the known body, or what turns the spatial
organization of a vocabulary – and vice versa – is the transformation
of the body into extension, into open interiority like a book, or like a
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silent corpse placed under our eyes. An analogous change takes place
when tradition, a lived body, is revealed to erudite curiosity through a
corpus of texts. Modern medicine and historiography are born almost
simultaneously from the rift between a subject that is supposedly literate,
and an object that is supposedly written in an unknown language. The
latter always remains to be decoded. (“Writing and Histories” 25)

The body gives material to the legal and normalizing discourse.
Supposedly not yet “read” before it passes the threshold of the doctor’s
door, the body becomes a legible text, a written corpus to be decoded
under certain and specific norms. Later in his essay de Certeau refers
to ‘heterology’ as a discourse on the other, but “built upon a division”
between that which nourishes it and the knowledge that is constructed
out of it (25). The normalizing language code that de Certeau refers to,
in connection with Charon’s approach, poses the problem of how to
comprehend the body and the text that it creates.
Sensation is crucial for both de Certeau and Charon in their
analysis and understanding of the body. A similar stance is taken from
disciplines that disagree with medicine, such as disability studies and
Mad studies. According to Tobin Siebers, one of the main proponents of
disability studies, “The pathologization of other identities by disability
is referential: it summons the historical and representational structures
by which disability, sickness, and injury come to signify inferior human
status” (6). Sensations may not be entirely based on what the body feels
or comes to understand, but they may also involve how the body is
diagnosed. Pathology is not only a way to decode the body, as seen in
de Certeau, but also of restricting signifiers and meanings to the corpus
comprised by history and medicine. Normalization involves how the very
sensations of the perceiver fall within the assemblage of the corpus: the
patient becomes codified, but to a certain extent so does the physician.
Similarly, Mel Starkman, one of the first advocates of Mad studies
in Canada, asserts that “Psychiatric inmates are victims, not of their
‘madness,’ but of these (no doubt well-intentioned) efforts to pigeonhole
them and solve their problems in a ‘scientific’ way” (27). I take Starkman’s
point in the same direction towards initiating a debate about how
to understand sensations. It is important, as Charon proposes, that
physicians understand what patients feel, but also how the same corpus
of knowledge that medicine has created affects the way the physicians
are (or are not) able to connect and sense their patients.
I will be trying to incorporate Caron’s dialogism, along with
Starkman’s and Siebers’ caveats, into a reading of the fantastic, inspiring
a relevant contact between theory and literature. When such point of
contact can be established, health humanities and narrative medicine
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begin to raise questions of share interest. Two researchers stand out in this
respect: physician Jeffrey P. Bishop and anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly.
Bishop’s chapter, “Scientia Mortis and the Ars Moriendi: To the Memory of
Norman,” in the Health Humanities Reader, begins by questioning health
humanities, taking as its basis the similarities and differences between
being humane, humanism, humanity, and the humanities. In Bishop’s
words, “The similitude of the names elides difference among the terms,
differences that, when pointed out, make us feel uncomfortable. After
all, who could be against humanity or against humanism or against the
humanities?” (387). Bishop attempts to convey the differences that exist in
the various practices of the humanities, at one end of the spectrum, and
of medicine, at the other. Both disciplines are involved with humanity.
However, they do it differently and the basis of “being humane” is lost
in-between. For Bishop, that which is lost is the ‘spiritual sensation’
that he finds in the humanities but finds lacking in medicine. Medicine
is a ‘scientia mortis’ and the humanities an ‘ars moriendi.’ Playing on
Foucault’s references, Bishop is describing medicine as a science of
how to delay death and of how to die ‘properly.’ The humanities, on
the other hand, allow for a more personal approach to life and death.
To blend both into ‘health humanities’ becomes problematic given their
differences. If medicine were to incorporate spirituality as part of the
medical humanities project, this spirituality would end as a slave to
numbers. Bishop states that,
[…] our spiritual assessments either become part of the totalizing
tendency of the human sciences, or they are utterly irrelevant to those
who are dying. As a point of contrast to the scientia mortis, I shall describe
an ars moriendi, one that resists the instrumentation of spiritual experts.
It is an art of dying grounded in ars vivendi; it is highly particular and
local—and particularly storied. (389)

The tendency at the point of falling into the verge of death appears to
be a reclaiming of spiritual grounds in order to feel more prepared. Bishop
refers to research which points to an increased pattern of spirituality in
the face of death. However, when this research is measured as per the
norm in the sciences, Bishop argues that it loses its meaningfulness for
the dying subject. “Scientia mortis” can be then related to de Certeau’s
“heterology,” in which knowledge is shown to nourish that which
nourishes it. The rise of ‘spiritual experts’ attests to Bishop – and to
certain degree to de Certeau’s – point: it is a practice of decoding rituals
into a language available for the diagnostic. However, as far as Bishop’s
argument goes, life seems to elude becoming a narrative. In the face of
death, those in their ‘ars vivendi’ and ‘ars moriendi’ come to comprehend
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and feel something that might not have been present before.
Mattingly’s work based on anthropological observations in Los
Angeles hospitals pays attention to the racialization of medical care in
the United States, but also turns its focus on the religiosity and affinity
between patients in ways that defy scientific measurement. For Mattingly,
“Hoping is no mere personal affair when it comes to health care in a
multicultural urban hospital. It is a border activity” (6). As a ‘border
activity,’ hoping is an example of those factors that an assessment fails
to capture. Moreover, it is never easy to assert hope in the face of death.
Thus, Mattingly asks: “How is hope cultivated in a border zone? How does
this border practice shape hope for parents, children, and clinicians?” (6).
Going back to de Certeau’s argument in regards to the objectification of
the patient, Mattingly takes a different and yet similar route: regardless
of the evident racial discrimination against marginalized patients, the
latter manage to strive for life on the fringe of death. Again, I must add,
not only the medical institution itself defeats the narrative that Charon
wants to find in medicine; there is also a live presence that escapes being
grasped by diagnoses.
A Haunting Presence
A new spectre is haunting the health humanities: the spectre of
fantastic literature. This part of the paper will concentrate on how the
fantastic genre serves as a guideline to counteract what could become
an over-narrativization of sensations that, as per de Certeau, evade the
codification of the body. The fantastic, I argue, may be the source for
such hope as it challenges the medical. The bare fact that there is not an
agreeable definition among literary scholars on what the fantastic means
or entails speaks volumes of its nature. In the following brief review of
theoretical approaches, I shadow Spanish critic and writer David Roas’s
theory of fear. I also follow de Man’s take on the fantastic as a genre that
reverses the belief in dialogism.
Roas argues that the fantastic contains an element of fear, which
involves the reader as a detective. Taking this argument as a basis of
my own detective investigation into an indefinable literary genre, the
question becomes, as Roas suggests, what does fear do in and by itself,
and what does it entail? Before tackling fear, it is necessary to connect
the dots from the discussion on the medical and how it relates to the
fantastic. My argument is that stories of this literary genre defy the limits
and categories that sciences in general and medicine in particular would
like to see codified. Moreover, the theme of that sensation beyond words
reappears with more force in fantastic literature. I will, thus, attempt to
open a conversation between the health humanities and literary theories
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of the fantastic.
In his book chapter “La amenaza de lo fantástico,” Roas states
that “la literatura fantástica pone de manifiesto la relativa validez del
conocimiento racional al iluminar una zona de lo humano donde la
razón está condenada a fracasar” (9). The fantastic creates a paradox by
itself: it cannot be defined, but only defied by codification, yet, it attracts
the attention of readers and scholars, perhaps because of its challenging
indefinability.
For Roas, the fantastic requires a supernatural element. It is an
irruption from inside as well as an interruption of the real: “la irrupción
de lo sobrenatural en el mundo real y, sobre todo, la imposibilidad de
explicarlo de forma razonable” (18). What Roas attempts, thus, is not to
explain the fantastic – this would be impossible as he had already stated.
Rather, the Spanish critic considers the supernatural as a requirement
in order for that sensation of fear to ‘shine’ and ‘illuminate’ an aspect of
being a human that would be otherwise denied by reason.
Reason, groping from hope into fear as it does in the pages of fantastic
literature, is not able to grasp that sensation that for these scholars
speaks volumes of what it means to be human. Even within different
approaches to the fantastic, newer trends intend to do away with the
categories that were introduced by Todorov. Although very influential,
Todorov draws rigid lines between genres and relegates the fantastic to a
codification. For Todorov, fantastic literature confines itself to the fine line
between the strange and the marvellous, and thus “puede desvanecerse
en cualquier momento” (“Lo extraño y lo maravilloso” 65). Limits have
specific meanings for Todorov, the implication being that the fantastic
must fit in a specific site, with its own language and reasoning.
My own reading of Todorov, especially of the closing paragraphs
of The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, questions his
interpretive style. Todorov states that the task of literature “is to go
beyond – otherwise it would have no reason for being; literature is a kind
of murderous weapon by which language commits suicide” (Fantastic
167). Similarly to de Certeau, a blurry area appears to Todorov, within
which an entity creates and nourishes itself from itself. Literature strives
to survive by pressing language into a suicidal state. Literature takes
everyday language, with its categories, structures, and practices into an
‘other’ level of discourse, where language dissolution appears imminent,
yet, where again, its redemption constitutes a proof that a space of
immanence – of survival – still exists. Secondly – and I am extending here
Todorov’s view – literature is able to give force to its readers and writers.
The stories that originate from the point between life and death become
weapons rather than medical or chemical prostheses. Thus armoured, the
human subject enters a new dimension previously unknown, wherefrom
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dangerous narrative adventures are neither excluded nor lethal.
From the previous arguments there arise crucial questions regarding
communication. If hope and fear shine in the face of death, how is language,
even with literature as a weapon, able to provide an avenue for dialogue?
Is language able to withstand the overwhelming intensity of hope and
fear? Can fantastic literature or the stories of illness then become illegible
for the experts? If that is the case, how is narrative medicine supposed
to operate? Can medicine sustain itself in the haunting presence of the
supernatural and its implied sensations of hope and fear?
The fantastic endangers reason, but not reasoning. To face a challenge
is an opportunity to enrich the ways in which reason operates. I tie my
own argument to Deleuze’s “To Have Done with Judgment,” where he
views language as a war zone, a “... combat, combat everywhere; it is
combat that replaces judgment.” Judgment, in this sense, is the scientific
element that tries to codify and subordinate. But even judgment enters
the war zone as one more warrior, not as a virtue of reason above the
battlefield, for such judgment would be wordless. Moreover, for Deleuze,
“it is the combatant himself who is the combat: the combat is between his
own parts, between the forces that either subjugate or are subjugated,
and between the powers that express these relations of force” (132). In
connection to fantastic literature as well as to narrative medicine, the
patient, if endowed with literature as weapon, can become a writer of
his or her own story. The unarmed patient, by entering that border or
war zone – in this case the clinic or the hospital – is subjugated to forms
of knowledge specific to medicine: violent, fearsome knowledge. Stories
are personal not because they occur to people, but because they refer to
the ability to escape a type of reasoning that restricts the subject from
expressing their own sensations in full.
However, if the dialogue that Charon presupposes in medicine cannot
take place in the simplest of its forms – as a ‘real conversation’ between
a physician and a patient – what does this say of the fantastic? Does this
shaking of the otherwise ungraspable sensations of hope and fear also
have implications for fantastic literature and its relation to authorship
and readership? To a certain degree, Roas, in his Tras los límites de lo
real: Una definición de lo fantástico, believes that communication can be
established in fantastic literature along the way. He argues that “[l]
a cualidad fantástica de un texto no es nunca apriorística, sino que se
establece a medida que avanzamos en la lectura” (63). In other words,
even though tautological, the act of reading must liberate itself in order
to read the fantastic.
Other theorists of fantastic literature, such as Susana Reisz and,
more recently, Patricia García, argue that the fantastic, more than being
paradoxical, tautological, or impossible, finds its space in the everyday
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life. It is a literature that creates a space for itself, which, in relation
to de Certeau’s everydayness, is both an affront to codification and
normalization by its own means. This is a normalization that cannot
remain static, as it must continue to renew itself in order not to commit
to a suicidal act, as Todorov shows in his book on the fantastic. Thus,
Reisz, in her analysis of Argentine writer Adolfo Bioy Casares, asserts
that “fantástica es toda ficción en la que lo imposible sólo admite una
explicación fantástica” (209). That impossibility occurs in the mundane,
which is what makes and gives it its fantastic quality. It is in that everyday
terrain of life where the tautological of the fantastic, as what nourishes
and constructs its epistemology and ontology, takes the fullest of its
power. The fantastic becomes invisible; that is, the haunting presence
that appears only in the face of death and the supernatural.
Similarly, García introduces the spatial turn in the humanities into
the study of fantastic literature in order to demonstrate how fiction of
this kind transforms readers into architects: creators of a livable space.
According to García, “physical space does not provide the frame in
which the Fantastic will appear; instead space is the Fantastic” (2). Her
argument focuses on one modality of fantastic literature, where space
conflicts with common perception. For the fantastic aspect to appear, the
space has to be established alongside the story, rather than a priori, and
does not allow for the naturalization of the supernatural. This, going
back to the problems of narrativization, implies that, as García puts it,
“[n]arrative […] is always an incomplete testimony of reality, and since
our means of expressing the real is narrative, all views on reality are
necessarily incomplete” (3). Her pronouncements over the real seem to
be a testimony of the paradoxical nature of fantastic literature: while it
needs reality, it attests to the ‘fact’ that reality is incomplete without it.
Reality, in order to be considered complete, needs the incorporation of
the fantastic element.
Charon, however, does catch a glimpse of this fantastic aspect of the
real. According to her, “[i]t is sometimes as if the body speaks a foreign
language, relying on bilingual others to translate, interpret, or in some
way make transparent what it means to say” (87). To put it into the
fantastic context and the discussion about the body as a corpus, Charon’s
statement turns out to be a superstition or belief: ‘it is sometimes as if.’
Moreover, for Charon a translation is necessary to make it into reality;
that is, reality as understood in the medical profession. I relate Charon to
García in the incompleteness of reality, in the narrative of the real. There
is something lost in translation, which narrative cannot take hold of.
It is this haunting presence that I refer to as the fantastic: the
appearance and disappearance of what is sensed as something more,
something hidden. At this point, bringing de Man’s understanding of
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deconstruction and dialogue proves necessary in this conversation as he
demystifies the apparently obvious dialogue between author and reader,
and instead shows that there are many points and figures lost. De Man’s
stance on dialectics and dialogism counteracts that brand of reception
theory championed by Wolfgang Iser, for instance, along with the attempts
made in health humanities and certain theories of the fantastic.
In “Action and Identity in Nietzsche,” de Man uses Nietzsche’s The
Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals as examples of texts that do
not rely on dialogue, even though they both appear to do so. According
to de Man, Nietzsche does not strive for an Apollonian and Dionysian
dialectics, or for a balance between the poles named after the two mythinformed figures. Nietzsche vigorously makes his point at the very
beginning of his Genealogy: “We are unknown, we knowers, ourselves
to ourselves: this has its own good reason. We have never searched for
ourselves—how should it then come to pass, that we should ever find
ourselves?” (i). De Man detects an element of negativity here, and comes
to the conclusion that Nietzsche’s statements deny a possible relationship
between entities through language or narratives.
De Man sees deconstruction as an act that denies authority. In his
words, Nietzsche’s text “deconstructs the authority of the principle of
contradiction by showing that this principle is an act, but when it acts
out this act, it fails to perform the deed to which the text owed its status
as act” (“Action” 22). In relation to health humanities and theories of the
fantastic, there is once more a paradox at hand: the text is not attempting
to enter into a back and forth conversation. If it does so, it contradicts itself.
The act of writing is not a dialogue between speakers and respondents
– there is not, necessarily a priori, an entity that absorbs and reacts in
a certain and determined manner. And, thus, the authority, as the one
that states what is to be absorbed, is deconstructed by its own fallacy.
When this brand of deconstruction is applied to the doctor’s reading
of the patient, it is the medical professional that refers back to him or
herself as an authority that refers to itself to assert itself – the patient
gets a fictitious chance to enter the conversation.
For de Man, this feedback onto itself creates an aporia: “if one wants to
conserve the term ‘literature,’ one should not hesitate to assimilate it with
rhetoric, then it would follow that the deconstruction of metaphysics, or
‘philosophy,’ is an impossibility to the precise extent that it is ‘literary’”
(“Action” 30). In other words, literature can have the force to impose
itself as an authority, for the writer is the rhetorician that knows how to
captivate and attract the audience. Yet, de Man reminds his readers that
philosophy is literary, that even he, as an author, is ‘literary.’
To recapitulate, de Man’s stance on dialogism and rhetoric applies to
the ungraspable quality of fantastic literature. For the health humanities
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as well as narrative medicine, this translates into the inability of the
professional to read properly. Medicine becomes a metaphor that does not
represent the body or text being read. As de Certeau puts it – similarly to
de Man –, “Books are only metaphors of the body. But in times of crisis,
paper is no longer enough for the law, and it writes itself again on the
bodies themselves” (“Scriptural Economy” 165). In reference to Kafka’s
penal colony, medicine is said to re-inscribe a scripture upon the body
in order to be able to read it – medically. However, when the body turns
fantastic, medicine is no longer able to represent it in its own jargon. With
the dialogue not occurring, a medical rhetoric with its own frames and
terms of reference arises on the horizon of belief.
Furthermore, de Man’s essay “The Epistemology of Metaphor,”
asserts that to seize is fundamental in order to understand. In his words,
“things become ‘truly real’ only by being appropriated and seized upon
with all the etymological strength implied in Begriff, the German word
for concept” (24). The concept is something that seizes and takes hold
of its objects. By becoming “truly real,” de Man means that seizing it
makes it translatable and understandable in the terms of the authority
that deems it with a certain and specific meaning. That is, I argue, the
case in medicine, where, as Charon suggests, the body speaks a language
that the physician then translates. A rigid form of communication is
established in the clinic, a language that may not be able to translate the
patient’s experience. Regardless of the limits it places upon what may
be considered “real,” the medical is incapable to seize it all.
De Man goes on to place the subject as “the central metaphor, the
metaphor of metaphors” (25). The reader is an authoritarian subject that
condones further significations, and, instead elaborates onto rhetorical
tropes. These devices, as pointed out by de Man and de Certeau, become
the norms and standards on which to judge the corpus: the text and, from
there, the patient. This is the encryption of the body into a regulatory
language: a medical semiotics. However, as de Man emphasizes, the
literary remains in between legalities of authority. Fiction itself is
fictionalized in the sense of being read in terms that make it ‘truly real.’
This element of making a strange sensation into a ‘reality’ can be detected
in both literary and clinical analyses. Both analyses are diagnostically
driven. But fantastic sensations escape the analytic capture. More bluntly
put, the ‘concept’ of the fantastic fails to capture the fantastic sensation: a
diagnosis may touch upon it but it cannot completely capture it – hence
its nature to propagate.
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Medical Dialogues: A priori Diagnoses?
In this section, I consider Felisberto’s fantastic literature as a case study
in which a priori medical and literary diagnoses have been performed. I
argue that Felisberto’s short story “La casa inundada,” while supplying
the basics for easy literary, medical, and psychoanalytical analyses, is
characterized by the mysterious sensation of a missing element – that
absence and abundance of meaning and signification above mentioned.
“La casa inundada” allows for multiple readings. These may be
authoritarian (in de Man and de Certeau’s sense of the word), yet they
also challenge easy categorization of the work as a literary text. This piece
of fiction remains alive despite and because of the attempts to make its
body into a defunct corpse.
As prominent scholar of Felisberto’s work, Ana María Hernández
points out, he was a writer influenced by phenomenologists such as
James, Bergson, and Husserl (xi). Hernández takes this influence as a
paradigm for Felisberto’s writing. With regards to the potential clinical or
diagnostic reading of Felisberto’s literature, this statement by Hernández
is important:
Felisberto no es un caso clínico, un inocente o un desajustado social
… Para lograr su propósito [él] tiene que construir un nuevo sistema
simbólico, ya que las palabras están viciadas con asociaciones
establecidas y los sistemas que con ellas se han construido. De aquí que
a menudo recurra a estructuras musicales como en el rondó y el tema
con variaciones que relacionan las notas y frases entre sí por medio de
la repetición y las variantes. (xiv)

The relevance of Hernandez’s comments comes from the possibility
that Felisberto does not use those rhetorical tropes that were signalled by
de Man, and that I connect to literary and medical analyses. Felisberto’s
fiction, according to Hernández, plays with elements outside of language,
such as music, in order to create new variations and escape meanings.
Such a statement, if ‘truly real’ in fantastic terms, rhymes well with de
Man when he argues that “[c]ontrary to common belief, literature is not
the place where the unstable epistemology of metaphor is suspended
by aesthetic pleasure, although this attempt is a constitutive moment of
its system. It is rather the place where the possible convergence of rigor
and pleasure is shown to be a delusion” (“Epistemology” 30). Using the
analogy of rhythm, both perspectives are tied into a deeper reading of
Felisberto: there is music to his fiction, a sensation of a harmony playing
in the background, with many variations in between. Those variants and
repetitions are not meant to be pleasurable even when composed with
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much rigour. Felisberto, instead, strives for a prose that enchants the
reader not by its words, but its endeavour is to manifest itself through a
musical line; hence, I argue, it is a fiction that may not recur to rhetoric.
In order to prove my point about the fantastic sensation taking the
place of rhetorical devices, I refer to Felisberto’s own philosophy of
literature, “Explicación falsa de mis cuentos”:
Obligado o traicionado por mí mismo a decir cómo hago mis cuentos,
recurriré a explicaciones exteriores a ellos. No son completamente
naturales, en el sentido de no intervenir la conciencia. Eso me sería
antipático. No son dominados por una teoría de la conciencia. Esto me
sería extremadamente antipático. Preferiría decir que esa intervención
es misteriosa. Mis cuentos no tienen estructuras lógicas. A pesar de la
vigilancia constante y rigurosa de la conciencia, ésta también me es
desconocida. En un momento dado pienso que en un rincón de mí
nacerá una planta. La empiezo a acechar creyendo que en ese rincón se
ha producido algo raro, pero que podría tener porvenir artístico. Sería
feliz si esta idea no fracasara del todo. (36)

From the previous arguments on the codification of language, I read
skeptically Felisberto’s words. First, if I reject the authoritarianism of
meaning, then it would not follow to fully assent by Felisberto’s words.
Criticism must remain constant, with its variants depending on the
context. What it is more interesting is the stance that Felisberto brings into
literature and consciousness: it is not a deliberate attempt at convincing
the reader. If this were true, it would follow that this writer is not an
author, in the sense of having authority that imposes meaning upon
words. Regardless, the very title of this statement triggers suspicion or
humour. If it is in fact “[una] explicación falsa,” it expresses that he does
not know what he is aiming at, and that would prove his point that the
story is a plant growing strangely inside of his mind. Yet, he is aware of
it and wishes his story (plant) to have “porvenir artístico.”
The sensation from his false explanation arises from the potential
for a sincere use of words. Felisberto shows himself to be confused by
his own ideas, and also to attempt to grow them, for the ideas not to be
“a complete loss.” It is especially at this point where the harmony that
Hernández identifies may pair up: a plant needs to not be overfed in order
to survive. Felisberto, as a writer, seems to be right in his flora metaphor,
as rhetoricians must provide more and more water to prove their point.
This is very different from the balance between the idea and the writer,
where the latter lets the former grow at its own pace. Thus, he finishes
by saying that “[l]o más seguro es que yo no sé cómo hago mis cuentos
porque cada uno de ellos tiene su vida extraña y propia. Pero también
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sé que viven peleando con la conciencia para evitar los extranjeros que
ella les recomienda” (37). Felisberto’s words are deep in meaning given
the context of this paper: he can neither diagnose himself nor his stories.
One may argue, however, that the strange sensation is a rhetorical
trope. At this point, Felisberto’s story “La casa inundada” comes in handy
as, indeed, “something strange [is] going on” between “strangers.” In
this story, a widow named Margarita hires a man (a piano player and
writer, a recurrent theme in Felisberto’s fiction) to row for her while she
goes every day on a small boat around an artificial lagoon filled with
plants. The island represents memory for her as previous moments of
life come to her mind while in the boat. The plants appear in connection
to those ‘strangers’ from Felisberto’s false explanation: as memories or
stories, they grow by themselves. Also, while not explicit, there is an
aspect of a romantic affair between the musician and the older woman.
For both protagonists, as well as for the reader and the writer, this
is a metaphorical tale: a questioning as well as physical journey, and
metaphorically fantastic.3
This point of a physical and metaphysical journey adds to the
sensation that Felisberto inserts something into his stories. Rather
than acting as an authority imposing meaning upon the plot, there is
meaning through other avenues outside of language, or an expansion
of its limits. For instance, as the musician attempts to get accustomed to
the strangeness of his everyday life – to row and listen to Margarita – he
sees himself navigating through the woman’s memory: “Pero ahora yo
debo esforzarme en empezar esta historia por su verdadero principio y
no detenerme demasiado en la preferencia de los recuerdos” (169). From
a medical point of view the musician’s lines may point to a personality
disorder.4 As a potential symptom, there is confusion inside the narrator’s
mind. He does not know where it begins, and more interestingly, he
wants the story from his (or Margarita’s) memory to grow organically;
that is, he does not feel in control of his own words.
The narrator’s disorder is amplified by what he considers the tonality
of Margarita’s voice: “Después que ella empezó a hablar, me pareció que
su voz también sonaba dentro de mí como si yo pronunciara sus palabras.
Tal vez por eso ahora confundo lo que ella me dijo con lo que yo pensaba”
(177). Her words become sensations and illusions that resonate inside
of him as thoughts and memories. Perhaps it is more than a personality
disorder, for a deep synaesthesia seems to be at work here. It is hard to
discern who the one ‘really’ narrating is, whose memories is the reader
exposed to, who is thinking behind the words, and how can words have
such a profound effect?
Memory itself is a trope in Felisberto’s works. As “La casa inundada”
advances and the protagonists blend, he writes: “Entonces supe, por
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primera vez, que hay que cultivar los recuerdos en el agua, que el agua
elabora lo que en ella se refleja y que recibe el pensamiento” (179). The
connection between the subject and its surroundings overwhelms both.
Memories are not simply stored in the brain; rather, they arise when the
subject is exposed to objects. Sensation triggers remembrance.
As for the lagoon itself, the inner memories are composed of physical
and mental elements. In an interesting passage near the middle of the
story, where the sensations among the two are at their highest, the
musician narrates:
Por fin, encontré su mano. Ella no me soltó hasta que pasé al asiento de
los remos, de espaldas a la proa. La señora Margarita se removía con la
respiración entrecortada, mientras se sentaba en el sillón que tenía el
respaldo hacia mí. Me decía que estudiaba un presupuesto para un asilo
de madres y no podría hablarme por un rato. Yo remaba, ella manejaba
el timón, y los dos mirábamos la estela que íbamos dejando. Por un
instante tuve la idea de un gran error; yo no era botero y aquel peso era
monstruoso. Ella seguía pensando en el asilo de madres sin tener en
cuenta el volumen de su cuerpo y la pequeñez de mis manos. (172-3)

Using more direct medical discourse, from this passage I will attempt
to justify a diagnosis of a personality disorder as per the last edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V). Published
by the American Psychiatric Association since 1952, the DSM is used in
the everyday life of a physician as a scripture to follow and examine
the patient. With the intent of relating narratives, the DSM5 – Clinical
Cases was chosen. The chapter 19 focuses on personality disorders,
briefly listing the patient’s symptoms, a diagnosis, and a discussion. The
musician’s symptoms of a personality disorder are more acute in this
passage: intensification of physical signs, distraction, anxiety, isolation,
and a lack of sexual desire despite their nearness – very close, indeed,
to a case in DSM5 in which an old man is diagnosed with a “Schizoid
personality disorder.” This subject, “Mr. Buchalski,” is described as a
strange character that had never had a romantic relationship, was not
gregarious, and was a writer of futuristic technologies. The problem
comes in when his sister dies and Buchalski fails to report her death. It
is then that body signals become symptoms. The physician writes:
On examination, Mr. Buchalski was a thin, elderly man dressed neatly
in khakis and button-down shirt. He was meticulous and much
preferred to discuss his interests in science than his own story. He
made appropriate eye contact and had a polite, pleasant demeanor.
His speech was coherent and goal directed. His mood was “fine,” and
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his affect was appropriate though perhaps unusually cheerful under
the circumstances. (n.p.)

Despite the attempt of the physician to listen, the patient was deemed
to have a disorder because of his inability to explain himself through
a ‘credible’ narrative. Also relevant to the discussion is the fact that
the physician himself noted that there was something else involved:
there is something odd about Buchalski. The disorder is attributed to
the old man on the basis of his ‘strange’ behaviour. It is distressing to
think that the same rules may be applied to ‘analyze’ a literary text. An
analysis, medical or literary, under specific terms of reference, converts
the story into what de Man points out as a ‘concept.’ If I had to put the
fantastic metaphor into medical terms, as a non-expert in medicine my
words would be the following: the fantastic is an infectious disorder
(or syndrome) with variable psychiatric and somatic symptoms. As
vague as this attempt to a definition may sound, it pays attention to the
indefinability of the fantastic and to the intriguing sensation that there
is a feeling of something missing in diagnostic-driven readings. This is
where I find fantastic literature to open up a possible line of dialogue,
because it is a different way to read without much intervention.
The fantastic has the potential to become an avenue for a dialogue: a
prognosis rather than a diagnosis. I use the medical terms of diagnosis and
prognosis in a metaphorical sense with regards to the literary criticism
of fantastic literature. Prognosis, meaning fore-seeing, returns one to
Felisberto’s style of writing. As Felisberto foresees in his “Explicación,”
there is a strange sensation inside of him when he has the urge to write;
however, it is a sensation that cannot be overfed. In the same vein, the
‘concept’ in de Man and the codification in de Certeau remit the scholar
of fantastic literature not to diagnose in advance, but instead to do a
careful prognosis of what it is to come. Roas, then, may be right when
he points out that the fantastic unfolds itself.
Getting back to “La casa inundada,” the story ends with the ‘boatman’
being asked to quit his job. He then receives a letter from the widow:
Querido amigo: el día que lo vi por primera vez en la escalera, usted
traía los párpados bajos y aparentemente estaba muy preocupado con
los escalones. Todo eso parecía timidez; pero era atrevido en sus pasos,
en la manera de mostrar la suela de sus zapatos. Le tomé simpatía y
por eso quise que me acompañara todo este tiempo. De lo contrario, le
hubiera contado en seguida y usted tendría que haberse ido a Buenos
Aires al día siguiente. Eso es lo que hará mañana.
Gracias por su compañía; y con respecto a sus economías nos
entenderemos por medio de Alcides. Adiós y que sea feliz; creo que
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buena falta le hace. Margarita.
P.D. Si por casualidad a usted le ocurriera escribir todo lo que le he
contado, cuente con mi permiso. Sólo le pido que al final ponga estas
palabras: Esta es la historia que Margarita le dedica a José. Esté vivo
o esté muerto. (190)

The story concludes with words not from the narrator, but from the
immense woman with heavy words. The widow allows the musician to
go ahead and write as he wishes. However, an expression of gratitude
and debt must be included at the end of whatever he may write from
his account of his experience in the flooded house. It is worth noting
how Margarita recounts that the reason she let the pianist stay was his
apparent shyness – a motherly sense of wanting to stay together. Once
again, the psychiatrist and the literary scholar may cross paths and point
at this as an episode with psychological ramifications.
However, as seen in the letter’s postscript, it does not matter whether
the widow’s man were alive or dead – words still hold their power of
signification. The pianist is open to write and read as he sees fit, regardless
of the situation. The story within the story itself embodies the ‘plant’
Felisberto senses growing inside of him. A certain respect towards the
inspiration or idea for the story is to be granted and recognized. And,
this debt to something that escapes the confines of the writer, signals
the loss of the authoritarian and codified language.
The fantastic that Felisberto personifies through his characters, texts,
and plots, is, nonetheless, written in language and open to multiple
interpretations. This precise nature of fantastic literature catches more
than the impossibility seen above: it does more than seize meanings and
concepts. It is a fiction that is not symbolic or figurative. It is a writing that
transgresses the possible diagnosis from literary and medical analyses. It
is a prose that combines characters with plots that do not always align:
repetitions and variations allow for the senses to come into play.
Let me close by sensitizing these arguments. While I – a patient who
has tried hard to translate my pain to various medical personnel – may
attempt to detach myself from my topic, I may be incapable of doing so.
My metaphors might, though, acquire a specific meaning by their use
throughout this essay. My dialogue with Felisberto must be sensed, for it
is sensation that I thrive for: not the “truly real,” but rather the impossible
sensations to express in standardized terms. As Mark Vonnegut puts it,
the patient must able to speak up and the doctor to shut up. That is the
point at which an authority figure does not lose credibility but gains
entrance into a world outside of its own. To do so, as de Certeau argues
and I believe Felisberto would agree, books must stop being “only
metaphors of the body,” with paper no longer a device that “writes itself
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again on the bodies themselves” (“The Scriptural Economy” 165). The
body must take property of the book and the blank page, as a metaphor
of the fantastic, from which a carnal dialogue is born outside and against
whatsoever language deems as “real.”
1
Jr.
2

NOTES

Mark Vonnegut is a physician and son of American writer Kurt Vonnegut
I use ‘corpus’ to mean ‘patient,’ but also ‘body, or object of study.’

3 Susan Sontag’s use of illness as a metaphor to Felisberto’s fiction is of
relevance for a further paper in connection to Hernández’s understanding of
musicality in “La casa inundada.” In both cases, there appears to be a fantastic
metaphor: the unreal is revealed as a contradiction to the normalized everyday
reality. There are, at least, two fantasies playing along: one, the piano musician
trying to make sense of his job as a rower, and the widow attempting to
recreate her former house in a trapped island. They are both escaping reality.
If not illnesses per se, I identify both cases in the same story as instruments
attempting to align themselves and resulting in a rondo.
4
I will be using the DSM-V, with further discussion in the following
paragraphs.
WORKS CITED

American Psychiatric Publishing. “Chapter 18: Personality Disorders.”
DSM5 – Clinical Cases. Ed. John W. Barnhill. Washington, DC: American
Psychiatric Publishing, A Division of American Psychiatric Association, 2014.

Bishop, Jeffrey P. “Scientia Mortis and the Ars Moriendi: To the Memory
of Norman.” Health Humanities Reader. Eds. Therese Jones, Delese Wear, and
Lester D. Friedman. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2014. 387402.
Charon, Rita. Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006.
de Certeau, Michel. “The Scriptural Economy.” The Certeau Reader. Ed.
Graham Ward. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000. 158-76.

___. “Writing and Histories.” The Certeau Reader. Ed. Graham Ward.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000. 23-36.
de Man, Paul. “Action and Identity in Nietzsche.” Yale French Studies 52
(1975): 16-30.
___. “The Epistemology of Metaphor.” Critical Inquiry 5.1 (1978): 13-30.

Deleuze, Gilles. “To Have Done with Judgement.” Essays Critical and
Clinical. Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco. London and New York:
Verso, 1998. 126-35.

JAIME R. BRENES REYES

191

García, Patricia. Space and Postmodern Fantastic in Contemporary
Literature: The Architectural Void. New York and London: Routledge, 2015.

Hernández, Ana María. “Introducción.” Las Hortensias y otros cuentos,
Felisberto Hernández. Ed. Ana María Hernández (Doral, FL: Stockcero, 2011),
pp. vii-xxvii.
Hernández, Felisberto. “La casa inundada.” Las Hortensias y otros
cuentos. Ed. Ana María Hernández (Doral, FL: Stockcero, 2011).167-90.
___. “Explicación falsa de mis cuentos.” Las Hortensias y otros cuentos.
Ed. Ana María Hernández (Doral, FL: Stockcero, 2011). 35-6.
___. Novelas y Cuentos. Ed. José Pedro Díaz. Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho,
1985.
Hofstadter, Douglas. I Am a Strange Loop. New York: Basic Books, 2007.

Iser, Wolfgang. The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose
Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1974.

Jones, Therese, Delese Wear, and Lester D. Friedman, eds. Health
Humanities Reader. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2014.
Mattingly, Cheryl. The Paradox of Hope: Journeys through a Clinical
Borderland. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music. 1886.
Trans. Ian Johnston. Nanaimo, BC: Vancouver Island University, 2008.
___. The Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Horace B. Samuel. New York: Boni
and Liveright, 1887.
Reisz, Susana. “Las ficciones fantásticas y sus relaciones con otros tipos
ficcionales.” Teorías de lo fantástico. Ed. Roas, David. Madrid: Arco/Libros,
2001. 193-221.

Roas, David. “La amenaza de lo fantástico.” Teorías de lo fantástico. Ed.
David Roas. Madrid: Arco/Libros, 2001. 7-44.
___. Tras los límites de lo real: Una definición de lo fantástico. Madrid:
Editorial Páginas de Espuma, 2011.

Siebers, Tobin. Disability Theory. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 2008.
Sontag, Susan. Illness as Metaphor. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
1978.
Starkman, Mel. “The Movement.” Mad Matters: A Critical Reader in
Canadian Mad Studies. Eds. Brenda A. Le François, Robert Menzies, and
Geoffrey Raume. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc, 2013. 27-37.

Todorov, Tzvetan. “Lo extraño y lo maravilloso.” Teorías de lo fantástico.
Ed. David Roas. Madrid: Arco/Libros, 2001. 65-81.

192

INTI NO 85-86

___. The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre. Trans.
Richard Howard. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975.

